This paper discusses Marx's views on money as set out in Capital I, Part One (Chapter 3), in relation to his analysis of the commodity in the same part of that work (Chapter 1).
Introduction
In the first volume of Capital Marx introduces 'money' in Chapter 1 (section 3) and then reintroduces it in Chapter 3. At first sight the second introduction seems merely a superfluous excursion at this point since in the remainder of the book Marx apparently does not 'do' anything with it. He returns to money only in Capital II (Part Two) and then Capital III (Parts Four and Five) . This may be one reason why the Chapter 3 introduction has for long time been much neglected.
Over the last fifteen years commentators of Marx have much focused on the aspect of the 'commodity money' basis in Marx's theory. This is of course relevant for the current Marxian theory of capitalism, but it is irrelevant for the historical assessment of an author writing in the second halve of the 19th century. 1 Yet another issue is the methodological question of why Marx -given that commodity money basis -postpones a full account of credit money till later in the work. Here I ally with Campbell who argues that this issue should be assessed from within Marx's method and systematic, especially the gradual movement from relatively simple to complex concepts and accounts. 2 In this paper I provide a novel interpretation of the relation between the two introductions of money referred to (Chapter 1 and Chapter 3 of Capital I). Particularly I will argue that Chapter 3 sheds indispensable light on what happens in Chapter 1; Chapter 1 is a one -sided account that gets complemented in Chapter 3. A neglect of the core aspect that I will emphasize about Chapter 3 must have consequences for all the further interpretation of the book -however I cannot deal with the latter within the confines of this paper. This paper is historiographic and hence I abstain from presenting my own (value -form theoretical) views. Thus there is no question of agreement or disagreement with Marx involved other than internal critique.
I refer to the German Das Kapital I by (1867G) and to the English Fowkes translation by (1867F). Unspecified page references (180) are always to the latter. Note that Chapters 1-3 together constitute Part One of the book.
The monetary dimension

Form, prevalence, systemic existence
The standpoint of Chapter 1 of Capital I is 'the commodity'. The relatively brief Chapter 2, on the process of exchange, introduces social actors of exchange and the action of society to turn a particular commodity into the general equivalent 'money' ( 180) within a society of generalised commodity production (187). Thus Chapter 2 posits the prevalence (Dasein) of money in practice. Whereas Chapter 1 already posits the form of money, money itself -i.e. its systemic existence -is derived in Chapter 3. Notably it is systematically derived from exchange -like the commodity and value had been derived from exchange. Behind it is a notion of dissociate production, but this is implicit. 4 It is only later that the role of value, that is money's role in production and the full circuit of capital will become explicit (that is in all the rest of Capital). But in order to apprehend this role, Chapter 3 is absolutely crucial.
Extroversion
Throughout Chapter 3 Marx frequently uses for 'to sell' the term veräußerlichen which literally means 'to outer' or 'outering'. Nevertheless, the normal German term would be verkaufen (a term that he also uses -the difference is lost in the English translation). He also uses entäußeren for the same, as well as other terms with the same root of außer, especially Außdruck (expression; compare the roots außer, outer, utter). This homology is also lost in the translation. A restudy of a number of German texts of Capital (and together with insights from Hegel's work) makes me conclude that there are far less such remnants than I thought before. Next to the current paper my (2004) is a key to this.
The term 'outer' makes one of course alert for an 'inner' or 'immanent'. Moreover, against the background of Marx's familiarity with Hegel's philosophy the terms are rather heavy; they point at 'moments' that can be distinguished but that inseparateley belong together.
At the end of the first section of Chapter 3 of Das Kapital I Marx writes (1867G: 118 -italics added):
Die Preisform schließt die Veräußerlichkeit der Waren gegen Geld und die Notwendigkeit dieser Veräußerung ein.
Fowkes translates (198):
The price-form therefore [?] implies both the exchangeability of commodities for money and the necessity of exchanges.
Apart from the 'therefore' this translation is defendable, but it completely looses the connection pointed out above. A more literal translation would be:
The price-form implies/entails the 'extroversibility' of commodities for money as well as the necessity of this 'extroversion'.
But without explication this would not make sufficient sense in English. 
The introversive and the extroversive constituent of value
In Marx's view money is one constituent of value (he does not use exactly this formulation). The immanent or introversive constituent of value is undifferentiated 'abstract labour' (Chapter 1), i ts extroversive ( außer) constituent is money (Chapter 3) -but these two inseparably belong together. Money is the necessary form of expression of value (Außdruck). That is, value has no existence without money.
6 This is the end-result of Part One.
5 Translation necessarily involves interpretation. Translators are confined to rely on the common interpretation of their days. Therefore a novel interpretation must have consequences for the translation.
6 My thoughts are intuitive without expressing them. My face is that due to its expression; when my skin has been injured by fire, my face is still my face, and yet not. It seems to me that the innere-äußere opposition is in between: internal -external (inadequate because of its `exogenous' connotation) impressive -expressive introversive -extroversive Anothe r way of saying that value has no existence without money, is to say that value is without exception of monetary dimension. 7 In fact this is already the outcome of Chapter 1. Its Section 3 presents the formation of the form of moneyor, it posits the form of extroversion (Veräußerlichung) which is the starting point for Chapter 3. 8 Marx introduces the concept of 'value-form' in Chapter 1. After that the term moves to the background -in the sense that it is only sporadically used. The reason is that in Chapter 3 the concept is concretised into its monetary expression. Key to this concretisation is money's role as measure of value as well as the meaning of 'measure' ( §3 below).
implosive -explosive (if we could cut their connotations of destruction). For Hegel especially, inward-outward would have to be added. Marx evades innere in the current context (he uses it in Capital I, Part Seven), and adopts instead 'immanent' (immanent). Henceforth I adopt the terms of immanent/introversive and extroversive. 
From a simple to an enriched notion of value
Section 1 of Chapter 3 sets out the 'function' of money as 'measure of values'. This may make the (false) impression of there 'being' value entities independently of the 'measure', that is independently of money. If Marx had started here from scratch and considered the measurement of a use-value in terms of money, the problem would not have arisen. In fact he considers commodities.
If my interpretation as set out in §1.3 is accepted we move from a simplified notion of value (Chapter 1) to an enriched one (that of the full Part One) each indicated with one term 'value' ( §2.2 below). Evidently we cannot but start Chapter 3 with the simple notion of value inherited from the previous chapters. Therefore, there might at first sight appear to be two lines of reasoning in Chapter 3: labourtime and money. Near to the opening of Chapter 3 Marx writes (188):
Money as a measure of value is the necessary form of appearance of the measure of value which is immanent in commodities, namely labour-time.
The first line of reasoning is an obvious reference back to the Chapter 1, what I call, simple -abstract 'immanent' or introversive notion of value with its imma nent measure, namely labour-time. The other line posits that money is 'the necessary form of appearance' of that immanency. The commodity, and hence value, has no existence without money: 'products of labour ... taking the form of commodities implies their differentiation into commodities and the money commodity' (188n).
The monistic focus on the introversive notion of value in much of the Marxian economics after Marx is certainly also due to Marx's presentation of the matter, especially his particular way of moving from simplified determinations to complex ones.
9 However, because of the inseparability of the introversive and the extroversive constituents of value, monistic phrases like 'labour-values', or conversely, 'value-prices' do not fit Marx's theory and hence are never used in Capital.
Very abstract labour
False analogies -abstract labour and abstract timber -and the disappearance of the simplified notion of abstract labour
The (false) impression of there being value entities independently of the 'money measure' is reinforced by (false) analogies with other types of measurement. When we measure the length of a table with a meter stick, the table's length exists independently of the stick. 10 The analogy is false because the table is fully constituted as material/substance (introversive) and form (extroversive). There is no obvious unique way to measure the length of the material of the table. That is, the length of e.g. timber and nails. Surely we can in principle measure the length of two odd pieces of freshly cut timber -in this sense we have measurables -but we cannot add those up in a unique sensible way because of their unequal shapes.
To redress the analogy: there is no obvious unique way to measure the 'introversive substance' of value. You cannot add up nails and timber to measure the length of a table, or at least these would be awkwardly related. The same goes for concrete labour in connection to value.
In Chapter 1, therefore, Marx takes recourse to the notion of 'abstract labour' as a simplified constituent of value (it would be misleading to call this even an abstract substitute measure).
11 It is most telling that after this chapter the term 'abstract labour' disappears! -with four exceptions. In face of the Marxian 10 Its length in meters does not exist independently of the stick (or rather the metric system), but that is not my point here.
11 I still think that it is to the point to conceive of `abstract labour' as a fore-shadow of money (as I did in previous work). But this notion has proven to be confusing in debates with those labourembodied proponents who think in terms of `abstract labour embodied' and from which I take distance (see Reuten 1993) . In previous work I adopted for abstract labour the composite mL (where m is the monetary expression of labour; and L in fact added-up concrete labour). As an interpretation of Marx this is wrong. (At leas t it is wrong to use Marx's term abstract labour for mL; mL is value-added which is a more concrete notion.) After the initiating Chapter 1 its notion -and the term -'abstract labour' is superseded and should not be used any more.
In my view many if not most of the problems for the interpretation of Chapter 1 have to do with the difference between abstract and concrete labour. Capital was not written (Marx thought) for philosophically educated readers. The meaning of `abstract labour' is not easy. In the course of explaining it Marx, I think, felt constrained to take recourse to all kinds of non-rigorous approximations, analogies and examples. However, these are overcome section-wise. Once the later section is comprehended it makes no sense to phrase that non-rigorously. (Didactic may require to explain the mathematical notion of fraction by example of a cake. It is expected that when we get to fractional exponential growth, the thinking in terms of cakes is past.) discourse of the last twenty years this cannot be stressed enough.
12
When in Chapter 1 Marx presents the commodity, he posits the ir being and prevalence (Dasein ). In fact their existence is only grounded when he gets to their production in Parts Three to Five (though even this grounding is still a simplified one). In a different jargon: their production is presupposed (the presuppos ition being grounded later). Similarly, when presenting the commodity in Chapter 1 Marx presupposes the money measure that is only grounded (still simple) in Chapter 3. Abstract labour fore-shadows the money measure.
Column 2 of Table 1 provides a schematic outline of the determinations of value. Column 1 sets out a hypothetical analogy with another realm. Several entries in the Table will be expanded upon later. 12 To my knowledge 'abstract labour' is further used: one time in Chapter 2, two times in Chapter 3 (F: 209, 240) and one time in Chapter 8 (F: 308) (German edition Chapter 6), all in Volume I. There are no occurrences in Volumes II or III. There is also an occurrence in the Results (F: 992-3).
Relatedly the term labour as 'substance' disappears after Chapter 3. To my knowledge there are three exceptions in each one of the three volumes (Volume-Chapter): I-11 (672), I-19 (677), I-23 (715), . These are references back to the I-1 notion (Volume I, Chapter 1).)
The term `homogeneous labour' equally disappears after Chapter 3 (without exception to my knowledge). We begin by a simplifying abstraction and reduce (e.g.) "tables" to a material substance that they have in common: timber; we consider this as a 'moment' of tables.
We begin by a simplifying abstraction and reduce "value" to a social substance that entities of value have in common: labour; we consider this as a 'moment' of value. The length of timber is a quality necessary for the being of tables -at least provisionally. (*)
The time of labour is a quality necessary for the being of value -at least provisionally. All tables have timber in common -at least provisionally, i.e. at the current level of abstraction (*); but they are not fully constituted by timber.
All value has labour in common -at least provisionally, i.e. at the current level of abstraction (*); but it is not fully constituted by labour.
" Tables" are material what tables are, and how they should be measured; the message is that in as much as it makes no sense to measure the length of fully constituted tables by the timber, it makes no sense to measure value by labour time.
Immanent substance and immanent measure -abstract labour and method
We saw that money is the necessary expression of value: only with money do we arrive at the extroversive form of immanent substance, that is the determinate 'being' of commodities. There cannot be a privileging of the one over the other (analogously: when we consider a specific table there is no point in privileging the 'introversive' timber and nails over the 'extroversive' creative act of forma tion of that table -or vice versa; the one without the other is not-table). In other words, 'value' and the 'commodity' is not fully constituted in Chapter 1 -merely as an initiating simplification. Marx's method is one of conceptual progression from simple to complex determinations. In the case at hand Chapter 1 establishes introversive notions of the commodity; at that level of the presentation the commodity has no determinate existence -rather 'prevalence' (Dasein ). The commodity of simple circula tion is fully posited only with its extroversive notions in Chapter 3 (completing Part One).
Marx's immanent measure of value in Chapter 1 -time of 'abstract labour' -is very abstract. It does not provide a measure of value in the sense that we (nowadays) usually use the term measure. Many commentators have brushed away this problem by identifying value and 'abstract-labour time'! 13 'Abstract labour' cannot be measured (in terms of time) with more sense than timber as abstracted from, for example, anything but its length. But for the latter this does not provide the full constitution of a table (merely substance); for the former this does not constitute value (merely substance).
I use the term 'very abstract labour' because in the literature on Marx, or developments from his work, the term 'abstract labour' has become somewhat worn out: it seems often identified with a quantitative part of concrete (!) labour: 1) producing at average conditions of production (hence, it is said, 'necessary'); 2) for the product of which there is demand (hence, it is said, 'necessary'); 3) that contributes to production in a particular sense -'productive' labour (hence, it is said, 'necessary'). These issues can be announced, however, there is no way of knowing them or measuring them prior to the market. Thus abstract labour has no determinate existence. Abstract labour has a dimension of time but, paradoxically, it cannot be measured unless we assume that abstract labour equals concrete labour (thus abstract from abstract labour).
Rather, value is fully constituted only when we have money; money in the market measures "abstract labour" and so determines "abstract labour" so to speak, however (!), at this point the term "abstract labour" is superfluous: we have value.
(Of course, it may be added, 'value' itself is an abstraction in practice.)
The notion of very abstract labour implies that Chapter 1 does not present a 'labour theory of value' (a term not used by Marx) in any quantifiable sense. From this again derives the conclusion that abstract labour, a fortiori, cannot be quantitatively implanted into lower levels of abstraction (and -to repeat -Marx does not do this).
The warning regarding the Chapter 1 notions of value and labour also regards 'money' within Chapter 3. It seems that for Marx a thing's 'being' the measure of value (Section 1) and its being the means of circulation (Section 2), constitutes it as being money. The heading of Section 3 is: 'money'. It means that only in that section money becomes constituted (though simple). This gives rise to a considerable language problem (as always in systematic dialectics) of how to talk about the entity prior to it (i.e. without running into artificial language). In the first two sections of Chapter 3 Marx often uses the term gold, but frequently also "money". But money has not yet been constituted -merely a simplified constituent.
Of course this problem applies to 'capital' in all of Capital. Each time (section, chapter, part, volume) we are further introduced into it. It is misleading to think of any early presentation as "truth"; it is also misleading to cite it like that. Until the completion it is always partial ('the whole is the truth' wrote Hegel).
Money's measuring: ideal transsubstantiation
Idealities
In this section I expand on the core of Chapter 3: 'money's measuring'. I begin with a fairly long quotation from early on in the chapter, which I take to be programmatic. It shows, first, that the value of an entity is a purely ideal form of its existence (this denies ontologically real 'embodiment'); second, the measurement in terms of money (gold) is an ideal act -it is performed through an imaginary equalisation with money (gold); third, as a result the second performance can be established by imaginary money. I amplify on the first two issues in §3.2 and on the third in §3.3. 
Marx's notion of 'measurement': 'verwandlen' and standardized measurement
When Marx refers to money's measurement he refers to an abstract genus. This is a problem for us. In everyday language and practice money is so much an ('imagined') concrete entity, that we tend to immediately give it the content of our particular money -the North Americans think of their dollars, the EMU citizens of euros etcetera. 'Money' however is the abstract general of these. This is a main difficulty of Chapter 3. If this is not grasped then Marx's distinction between measure of value and standard of price becomes a superficial one. 15 Marx points this out, but not clear enough.
It is important to stress this because it underlines the conceptual progress made in Chapter 3.
Usually when we think of a measure we think of a standard. However, when Marx says 'money measures value' he means that it establishes the commensuration, i.e. homogenisation.
16 Or: the value-form determination is concretised as money measure. On the other hand the 'taking measure' (and ticketing) of the value of a commodity is established in terms of a standard of price. The distinction between this 'measurement in general' and the specific 'taking measure' by way of a particular standard is most important. (Marx's terminology might seem idiosyncratic -in current language that is. However, in Hegel's Logic (both its versions) we have a similar usage of the term 'measure'. In hindsight this also sheds light on Marx's usage of 'immanent measure' for the Chapter 1 moment of value.)
As the measure of value it [money] serves to convert [verwandeln, transform] The second phrase, about the standard, specifies a unit (quantum) for the measurement of the quantity in the first phrase. For the second phrase we can use the analogy of (e.g.) length measurement: As a standard of length a particular rod (named meter or yard) measures 'entities of length' by a unit of length (one meter or one yard). As the standard of price, particular money (named dollar or euro) measures quantities of money (a pile of notes or coins) by a unit of price (one dollar or one euro). For the first phrase, as already indicated ( §2.1), the analogy would be false. Prior to the measurement we have 'entities of length' (such as tables). For the commodities, prior to the measurement, we merely have the 'introversive substance', which is a purely ideal or imagined introversive substance (cf. the quote in §3.1).
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The act of measurement by money (that is prior to the actual exchange) ideally 'transsubstantiates' commodities into form-determined entities and hence commensurate or homogeneous (cf. the quote 1867F: 192). This is like a miracle. But just as most Catholics that go to church every week or perhaps every day may homogenisation -it is a (very) abstract notion. 17 My interpolations in square brackets derive directly from the (German) text; interpolations in curly brackets are interpretative.
Note again that Marx of course departs from the Chapter 1 'immanent value' -a notion that is now, with the extroversion, transformed into a more concrete concept of value.
18 I use this term `substance' because Marx uses it. But even when prefixed by `purely ideal' the term risks to give rise to notions of `embodiment' (expanded upon in Reuten 1993) . not be very attentive any more to the miraculousness of the (ideal) transformation of bread and wine into the body of Christ, we are, when we mundanely buy our daily bread, usually not very attentive to the miraculous ideal transubstantiation as performed by the lady in the bakers shop.
This transubstantiation in reference to the Catholic celebration is one connotation of the German term Verwandlung (and its verb verwandeln ). Transformation and to transform is perhaps the preferable translation (unfortunately it is not consistently adopted). Thus money's measurement per-forms the valuehomogeneity of commodities. Or: money turns the hopelessly abstract immanent notion of 'abstract labour' into extroversive form, and therewith into a potential concretum (concretum, that is when the salto mortale is completed into the metamorphosis C-M). Without this 'measurement überhaupt', standards of price (or standards of value) make no sense.
Thus value is, in both its constituents (introversive and extroversive), imaginary or ideality. Although it is beyond the subject of this paper I should add that ideality can have real effect. In this case this is -as far as I am concerned -the point. 
Imaginary measurement by imaginary money
I now turn to the third aspect of the 'programmatic' quotation ( §3.1). If we restrict the discussion (as I have done so far) to money as measure of value, Marx goes as far as one could go at all in the commodity-money based monetary regime of his day (though see §4). That is within the restriction -much emphasised by Campbell (o.c.) -of simple commodity circulation, that is prior to the introduction of capital into the presentation, and hence prior to the introduction of money as finance. In hindsight it is easy (but a-historical) to criticise almost all of monetary theory prior to, say, 1973 for allotting a major role to metal in the top of the money pyramid.
If we compare the current 'pure credit -money' regime with a 'pure commodity money' regime the crucial step is not the demise of the Bretton Woods regime (the controlled international gold-dollar standard) -the latter is the tail. Crucial is the (national) irredeemability of banknotes and the prevalence of 'money of account' at all: imaginary money (cf. Marx's treatment of money of account in Section 3 of Chapter 3). 19 Thus the ideal or imaginary Verwandlung is accomplished by ideal or imaginary money (or -from a perspective of pure credit-money -by nominal money).
Extroversive hypostasation
One culmination of Marx's treatment of money as measure is the 'imaginary measurement by imaginary money' mentioned above. A second one is the hypostasation of money as extroversive measure, whence entities (as including insensuous ones) can take the price-form without having value (196).
The possibility ... of a quantitative incongruity between price and magnitude of value ... is inherent in the price-form itself. This is not a defect, but, on the contrary, it makes this form the adequate one for a mode of production whose laws can only assert themselves as blindly operating averages between constant irregularities. (196) However, the possibility of incongruity may go further than these irregularities. Marieken, Faust or a modern business manager can sell their souls. With the money they can buy indulgences or 'goodwill'.
Things which in and for themselves are not commodities, things such as conscience, honour, etc., can formally spe aking, have a price without having a value. (197) Whereas in their simplicity the introversive determinations of Chapter 1 are necessary -as Marx frequently repeats -the extroversive determinations are equally necessary. However, because it is inherent to the latter that these do not stick to the former, the extroversive measure hypothases. The upshot is of course a shift in the connection between the Chapter 1 'simple value' and the Chapter 3 price constituting 'value'. Whereas money necessarily measures value it can also measure nullities.
An introversive regress: bullion
The weakness of Marx's presentation dated 1867 is not at all, in my view, that he starts his account of money as measure with commodity money -the development of money of account from it is fine. The weakness is rather that when he gets to the final subsection of the chapter, 'World Money', he makes the impression of presenting the empirical prevalence of 'world money' in the shape of gold/silver -especially for settling international payments -as an argument for his starting point in commodity money. And instead of theorizing that prevalence, he just describes it: money 'falls back into its original form as precious metal in the shape of bullion' (240). What is more, he explicitly presents a regress to Chapter 1:
In the world market ... money functions to its full extent as the commodity whose natural form is also the directly [unmittelbar, i.e Thus the Chapter 1 'abstract labour' is only mediately measurable -we necessarily require money: money measures abstract labour. The one exception to this necessary mediation (in 1867) is the labour producing the commodity 'bullion'; because bullion as world money functions as general means of payment and general means of purchase, we have an immediate social form of actualization of abstract labour. (Today, of course, there is no exception.)
Summary and Conclusions
Value constitutes the historically specific social form of production in capitalist societies. Part One of Capital I introduces the concept of value by way of an analysis and synthesis of simple commodity circulation -that is, commodity circulation in abstraction from capital, the production of capital and the development of the circuit of capital (the subject -briefly -of the remainder of the work).
Although this social form has real (ontological) effect in shaping the material production in capitalist societies, it is an ideal form -in the sense that it is insensuously permutated to entities and processes. It has sensuous existence only in money and artefacts of accounting, themselves physically separate from those entities and processes -though utterly meaningless without the latter. In the interpretation of Part One of Capital I set out in this paper, the ideal immanent (or introversive) substance of the value of commodities is 'abstract labour' (sic). Its qualitative measure -i.e. the immanent measure of value -is 'time' of abstract labour. This is what I called the simple-abstract notion of value (of Chapter 1). It is defective and it has no real ideal existence (no ideal existence in practice).
This simple notion is complemented in Chapter 3 by the ideal extroversive form of the value of commodities: money. It is only henceforth that 'value' has been fully constituted. Money establishes the actual homogeneity of commodities, and is the only one actual ideal measure of value (adopting a particular standard).
The introversive substance and the extroversive form of value are inseparable. Value cannot be concretely measured without money -any effort to do so comes down to a Ricardian 'timber-nail tale' of measurement. However, we have seen that this inseparability is not symmetrical: money can measure, and purchase, nullities.
Once we are past Chapter 3, any talk in terms of abstract-labour(-time) is a regress to a simplification -i.e. simple or underdetermined value. Marx, though, does not make this mistake.
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